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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
TORTS
William E. Crawford*
PRESUMED FAULT FOR INJURIES BY
ANIMALS AND CHILDREN
In Holland v. Buckley,1 the Louisiana Supreme Court re-
jected the "first bite" rule which previously obtained in
Louisiana as a defense in actions for damages by dog-bite
victims. In its place, the court announced a rule, flowing from
Louisiana Civil Code article 2321, that the master of the ani-
mal is presumed to be at fault. The owner's presumed fault is
in the nature of strict liability and he may exculpate himself
from it only by showing that the harm was caused by the
fault of the victim, by the fault of a third person for whom he
is not responsible, or by a fortuitous event.2 The court jus-
tified the change in view of the responsibility of dog owners
by saying that "as between him who created the risk of harm
and the innocent victim thereby injured, the risk-creator
should bear the loss. He maintains the animal for his own use
or pleasure." 3 The court further explained that the instant
opinion was part of its return to the interpretation of the
Civil Code as written, but that:
We do not do so out of blind adherence to past doctrine,
however, but rather from the view that ancient intention
best serves modern needs. In the crowded society of to-
day, the burden of harms caused by an animal should be
borne by his master who keeps him for his own pleasure
or use rather than by an innocent victim injured by the
animal. 4
Justice Tate's opinion is careful to establish only a pre-
sumption of fault.5 Since the owner's liability is based upon a
presumption of fault, and not upon strict liability as set forth
in the common law theory of strict liability, the court avoided
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
2. Id. at 119.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 120.
5. Id. at 119. "The fault so provided is in the nature of strict liability, as
an exception to or in addition to any ground of recovery on the basis of
negligence, Article 2316." Id.
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the thorny problem of what to do with contributory negli-
gence. Of course, that problem is primarily obviated by simple
reference to the language of the opinion itself, when it allows
exculpation of the owner by showing fault in the victim.
Hence, while establishing the theory or basis of liability, the
opinion wisely sets up the defenses, so that one need not
wander down the shadowy hallways of theory to determine by
trial and error in what guise defenses must be presented.
This writer suggested some time ago that the canine free
lunch program should be ended.8 Holland represents a most
equitable balancing of risks and interests protected, set forth
in a viable theoretical structure. The only twinge of regret
evoked by the opinion is that the words "strict liability" are
used at all, since the term has been appropriated by the
common law to designate a theory of liability so distinct from
the "imputed fault" theory that its use sorely hinders accu-
rate analysis.
In Turner v. Bucher,7 the other presumed fault case, the
Louisiana Supreme Court undertook to create a viable struc-
ture for handling actions for damages inflicted by children
below the traditional age at which they are deemed capable of
committing offenses or quasi-offenses. In Turner a woman
walking on the sidewalk was struck from the rear and injured
by a six-year-old boy riding a bicycle. Under the jurispru-
dence, a six-year-old child is incapable of negligent conduct. 8
Further, under Johnson v. Butterworth,9 parents were not
liable for damage inflicted by their children unless the con-
duct of the child was itself tortious. Consequently, only an
independently negligent parent was liable for the damage
inflicted by his tender-aged child. Turner expressly overrules
Johnson, holding:
We conclude that although a child of tender years may be
incapable of committing a legal delict because of his lack
of capacity to discern the consequences of his act,
nevertheless, if the act of a child would be delictual ex-
cept for this disability, the parent with whtom he resides is
legally at fault and, therefore, liable for the damage oc-
6. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-
Torts, 33 LA. L. REV. 206, 218 (1973).
7. 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975). See Note, 49 TuL. L. REV. 1194 (1975).
8. E.g., Jackson v. Jones, 224 La. 403, 69 So. 2d 729 (1953).
9. 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
casioned by the child's act. This legal fault is determined
without regard to whether the parent could or could not
have prevented the act of the child, i.e., without regard to
the parent's negligence. It is legally imposed strict liabil-
ity. This liability may be escaped when a parent shows
the harm was caused by the fault of the victim, by the
fault of a third person, or by a fortuitous event.10
The opinion went further to add that "[t]he fact that the
conduct was tortious when measured by normal standards is
enough to render the father liable therefor."" Applying the
new rule to the instant facts, the court reiterated that under
the "usual standards of conduct" the actions of the child
would have been negligent. 12
The decision is explicitly result-oriented. The court relied
on the policy decision that an innocent victim should not be
denied reparation so long as there exists a source of financial
responsibility. 3 That source, it continued, should be the per-
son charged with the care of the minor due to his legal rela-
tion to and general legal responsibility for the minor.1 4 Hence,
the parent in Turner was liable for the act of the child.1 5
The case leaves unanswered three important questions:
(1) Is the "legal fault" or legally imposed "strict liability"
announced in the case different from the liability set forth in
Deshotel v. Travelers Indemnity Co.?16
(2) Are there now two age brackets of minors, i.e., those
of tender age and those of discerning age?
(3) What is the standard of care denoted by "normal" or
"usual" standards of conduct?
'With respect to the first question, in Deshotel a father
sued his insurer under the direct action statute17 for damages
occasioned by his son's allegedly negligent conduct. The court
found that the 15-year-old son had negligently injured his
father, for which injury the father had both a cause and a
right of action against the son, and hence against the insur-
10. Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270, 277 (La. 1975).
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 271.
13. Id. at 274.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 277.
16. 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259 (1971). See The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Torts, 32 LA. L. REV. 213, 218 (1972).
17. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), as amended by .La. Acts 1962, No. 471 § 1.
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ance company, by virtue of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.
Justice Barham, writing for the majority, further stated:
The Court of Appeal correctly concluded that Article 2318
is inapplicable here, and that it determines only the re-
sponsibility of the father for the delicts of the minor child
in relation to third parties. Article 2318 does not create
negligence in the father because of the minor's negligent
acts; it merely attaches financial responsibility to the
father for the delicts of his minor child.'8
Justice Barham, writing for the majority in Turner, again
characterized the financial responsibility of the parent under
article 2318 for injuries caused by his minor child. The re-
sponsibility, he said, is legal fault, or legally imposed strict
liability.19 Does the "legal fault" of Turner, then, bar an ac-
tion, previously available under Deshotel, by a father against
his insurer for the father's damages caused by the minor
child?
With regard to the second question, Deshotel dealt with a
child of discerning age while Turner did not. Neither case
mentions the differences, based on age, in duties owed by the
child to other persons. The Turner opinion purports to deal
only with tender-age children, and its overruling of Johnson v.
Butterworth is restricted to the holding concerning children of
tender age.20 Does the rule of liability under article 2318
differ between parents of discerning children and those with
children of tender age?
Finally, what standard of care should the court apply?
For the child of discerning age, the "usual standards" should
be the standards which now obtain, namely the conduct of the
reasonable child of similar age, experience and discretion.2 '
The issue left unanswered in Turner is what standard to
apply to children of tender age. A jury must be charged to
apply the law according to the applicable standard, and it is
material whether the standard is that of an adult or that of a
child.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to review the legislative
history of the French Civil Code or the Louisiana Civil Code
18. 257 La. 567, 573, 243 Sd. 2d 259, 261 (1971) (emphasis added).
19. 308 So. 2d at 277. See text at note 10, 8upra.
20. Id. at 276.
21. E.g., Jackson v. Jones, 224 La. 403, 69 So. 2d 729 (1953); Westerfield v.
Levis Bros., 43 La. Ann. 63, 9 So. 52 (1891).
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and make a case that compels the position announced in the
opinion. Apparently the court desired a change in the law
regarding liability for the acts of children of a tender age. If
one acknowledges that as a desirable goal, this opinion re-
quires immediate clarification to achieve the goal with a de-
liberate and orderly application of the law. On the other hand,
it is quite possible to differ strongly with the inexorable liabil-
ity which this opinion adopts for parents. As emphasized by
the elaborate dissenting opinion, 22 the French have never
cast this degree of liability upon a parent; neither has the
common law.
The instant opinion says that it reinstates the holding in
Mullins v. Blaise23 and the reasoning therein.2 Mullins, how-
ever, placed an emphasis on parental supervision not found in
Turner:
The act was a fault of the most culpable character. It is
true that by reason of the tender years and lack of dis-
cernment of the minor, this fault may not be, in a legal
sense, imputable to him .... The law itself imputes the
fault to the father. It presumes that it resulted from lack
of sufficient care, watchfulness and discipline on his part
in the exercise of the paternal authority. This is the very
reason and foundation of the rule.2
This writer suggests that Johnson v. Butterworth states
the better rule. That opinion carefully considered every ques-
tion of legislative intent and reached a result that still seems
desirable for modern society.
DAMAGES UNDER CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 667
Only the courageous should venture into the arena
wherein will be decided the nature of the obligations and
remedies under Louisiana Civil Code article 667. The case at
hand is Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,26 in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a petition stated a cause
of action for damages by alleging diminution of the value of
plaintiff's land resulting from the creation of a dangerous
22. 308 So. 2d at 277.
23. 37 La. Ann. 92 (1885).
24. 308 So. 2d at 277.
25. 37 La. Ann. at 93 (emphasis added).
26. 310 So. 2d 93 (La. 1975). See Note, 36 LA. L. REV. 711 (1975).
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nuisance on adjoining property in the form of works involving
inherent hazards and dangers. The question bound to pro-
voke great discussion is whether those damages should be
collectible under article 667 or instead under article 2315 as a
matter of fault based upon the violation of standards of care
established in article 667, h la Langlois.2 7
The Hero opinion states that both articles 667 and 2315
may serve as bases for recovery under appropriate circum-
stances. Further, it states that article 2315 "contemplates
responsibility founded on fault, namely, negligence or inten-
tional misconduct, including abuse of rights."2 Justice Tate
took exception with that statement, as did Justice Barham,
and the writer submits that their exceptions were properly
taken, for it is now well established that fault under article
2315 is broader than negligence or intentional misconduct.
The Langlois doctrine shows clearly that fault may be found
from the violation of article 667, and need not flow only from
negligent or intentional conduct. It is submitted that the
Langlois theory gives the most coherent and cohesive scheme
possible under the Civil Code for handling the recovery of
damages under article 667. The court in Langlois said that
the violation of article 669 constituted "fault," invoking arti-
cle 2315 with its mandate to repair the damage resulting from
the fault. One has only to recall Reymond v. State Department
of Highways,29 Chaney v. Travelers Insurance Co. 30 and the
volumes of discussion 3 1 written about those cases to look in
hopeful desperation for a clean-cut characterization of the
obligations contained in article 667 and the means for imple-
menting the remedies for breach of those obligations.
The per curiam of the court on rehearing pointed out that
its holding was restricted to diminution of value from ultra-
hazardous construction. It is a curious restriction because the
provisions of article 667 are not so restricted. The "obligation
of vicinage" may be violated without negligence, without in-
tentional misconduct, and without conduct constituting an
27. Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1084, 249 So. 2d 133,
140 (1971).
28. 310 So. 2d at 97.
29. 255 La. 425, 231 So. 2d 375 (1970).
30. 259 La. 1, 249 So. 2d 181 (1971).
31. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-
Property, 31 LA. L. REV. 196, 217 (1971); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 231 (1971).
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abuse of righta 2 It seems then that a cause of action should
be stated when facts are alleged showing damage from the
neighbor-defendant's works without their being ultra-haz-
ardous.33
APPELLATE REVIEW OF LOWER COURT DECISIONS
Damage Awards
Revon v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. 34
is a major research source on the question of appellate review
of damage awards. In that case the Louisiana Supreme Court
chose to set forth, as definitively as it could, the rule that the
trial court has "much discretion" in fixing damages, as au-
thorized by Louisiana Civil Code article 1 9 3 4.3 But when has
the trial judge crossed the forbidden barrier and "abused his
discretion"? The cases point out that the mere fact that an
award is different from prior awards elsewhere in the juris-
prudence does not necessarily make it an abuse of discretion.
The jurisprudence serves only as a guideline.
There is little guidance in the jurisprudence to determine
what constitutes an abuse of discretion. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court in Gaspard v. LeMaire36 reduced an award from
$19,500 to $8,500 on the grounds that the amount awarded by
the jury was far out of line with those given to the plaintiffs
in other cases for similar injuries. On rehearing the court
pointed out that to seek too intensely a degree of uniformity
of awards in court decisions was error, and that each case
should be compensated on the basis of its particular circum-
stances. It cited with approval the opinion of the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal in White v. Robbins3 7 that the court
should not make awards entirely out of proportion with pre-
vious judgments for somewhat similar injuries, and that the
32. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage;
Articles 667-69 and 2815 of the Civil Code, 48 TuL. L. REV. 195 (1974).
33. From a procedural standpoint, if the case had been decided otherwise
it would be difficult for a plaintiff claiming under article 667 to overcome an
exception of no cause of action, because the essential allegations are that the
defendant performed works on his land which caused injury to plaintiff's
adjoining land.
34. 296 So. 2d 257 (La. 1974).
35. See also Bitoun v. Landry, 302 So. 2d 278 (La. 1974).
36. 245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149 (1963).
37. 153,So. 2d 165 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
[Vol. 36
1976] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1974-1975 407
function of the reviewing court is "simply to determine
whether the present trial court award is manifestly excessive
or manifestly insufficient under all the circumstances in the
present case." 38
In Walker v. Champion,39 Chief Justice Sanders dissented
from the court's approval of an award of $100,000 to plaintiff,
pointing out that an extensive survey of comparable cases
involved awards running from $12,000 to $50,000. He con-
cluded that accounting for all pertinent factors, including
the decreased purchasing power of the dollar, a reduction to
$50,000 would bring the award within the range of discre-
tion.40 It seems to be a necessary inference from the foregoing
that if an abuse of discretion is to be shown, it must be on the
basis of prior awards in similar cases. Since the award in
Walker exceeded any prior award by $50,000, or 200%, it is
difficult to say that any consistent proportion can be relied
upon as a basis for asserting excessiveness.
Factual Conclusions
As to factual conclusions, the bracket of discretion within
which the lower court's finding must fall in order to be hon-
ored by the appellate courts is that the evidence must furnish
"a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's finding."4' In
Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc.,42 Justice Tate
cited Dinvaut v. Phoenix of Hartford Insurance Co.43 and
further concluded that a trial court determination of causa-
tion should not be set aside under the manifest error principle
"if there is a reasonable basis for the finding under reasona-
ble trial court evaluation of the evidence and reasonable in-
ferences therefrom.""
It is submitted that trial court determination of factual
matters should be honored if there is evidence in the record to
support the factual determinations of the trial court. Under
the facts in Dinvaut, it seems difficult to say that the trial
court's conclusions were not reasonably predicated upon the
evidence. The issue there was whether the accident in ques-
38. Id. at 167.
39. 288 So. 2d 44 (La. 1973).
40. Id. at 48.
41. Dinvaut v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 294, 296 (La. 1974).
42. 304 So. 2d 351 (La. 1974).
43. 302 So. 2d 294 (La. 1974).
44. 304 So. 2d at 354 n.1.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tion caused the medical disability that had persisted in the
plaintiff since the time of the accident, or whether the effect
of the accident had ceased at a given point in time and the
disability from that point forward was caused by other physi-
cal conditions in the plaintiff having no connection to the
accident. The trial court and the court of appeal found that
the effect of the accident terminated at a given point and
gave a rather low award for that reason. The supreme court,
with Justice Dixon writing the opinion, reversed both the
trial court and the court of appeal, holding that the finding of
lack of causation was erroneous. Justice Dixon pointed out
that in thus finding that a higher award of damages for the
disability was warranted, the court was not changing the
award of damages, which would have rested within the "much
discretion" rule of article 1934, but rather was changing an
erroneous factual conclusion. Hence, the factual conclusion
was subject to the "manifest error" rule rather than the
"much discretion" rule, although the "manifest error" rule
carries with it much the same protection for the trial court's
finding of fact as the other for its award of damages.
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